[security-area] Fwd: How ambiguous are names in actuality?
vwelch at ncsa.uiuc.edu
Mon Jul 18 12:48:44 CDT 2005
I missed Tim's second point. I agree that looks like the promising
Mike Helm writes (15:57 July 14, 2005):
> "Von Welch" writes:
> > An interesting note from Tim Polk on ambiguous names in
> > PKIs. Unfortunately it doesn't apply to the types of PKIs we use in
> > Grids since it assume a single trust anchor that cross certifies all
> > peers.
> On the contrary, at least 2 of 3 of these are very good recommendations
> and definitely apply to Grids.
> #1 is one that seems commonsensical (probably not very important, tho).
> Software should do this - what would openssl do? (Do I need to ask :^)
> #2 is something I have been campaigning for, for years. Not alone either.
> #3 name constraints - interesting, but name constraints are dead as a doornail
> because of how PKIX managed this attribute; and besides, for Grid work, the
> access control is provided in the wrong direction (the relying party
> is supposed to apply this rule, in the Grid ideology), and so it is at
> worst irrelevant and at best a minor, and hard to maintain, benefit.
> This issue was solved, perhaps imperfectly, with the signing_policy file.
> #2 is the key - is it enough? I've seen some MS certs with an AIA extension
> that point back to a trust anchor, so you can tell directly in what hierarchy
> this cert belongs - is that useful? Is that needed in a full network
> > (1) Modify section 6.3.3 to state that CRL validation MUST use the same
> > trust anchor T specified in the corresponding certification path.
> > (2) Add security considerations that indicate applications that accept
> > multiple trust anchors should consider the trust anchor in access control
> > decisions to ensure that names are unambiguous.
> > (3) Add security considerations that explain the importance of consistent
> > use of path length and name constraints in preventing name ambiguity
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